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CONTRACT LAW-Employee Handbooks: At-Will or Not At-Will?
A Question of Form Over Substance. McDonald v. Mobil Coal
Producing, Inc., 820 P.2d 986 (Wyo. 1991).

In my opinion, [McDonald II] strikes the death knell for
-JUSTICE THOMAS'
employment at-will in Wyoming.
Craig McDonald (McDonald) became aware that his employment
with Mobil Coal Producing, Inc. (Mobil) would be terminable at-will
when he signed his employment application in August of 1987.2
McDonald was subsequently hired, began working and soon thereafter received an employee handbook, the purpose of which was ex-

plained in a general welcoming section.' The intention of the handbook
was stated to be a "guide ... to help ... [the employees] understand

1. McDonald v. Mobil Coal Producing, Inc., 820 P.2d 986, 992 (Wyo. 1991) (Thomas,
This was the second time this case was heard by
J., dissenting). [Hereinafter McDonald 11].
the Wyoming Supreme Court. The first case, McDonald v. Mobil Coal Producing, Inc., 789
P.2d 866 (Wyo. 1990) [hereinafter McDonald 1, resulted in a decision of which there was no
majority reasoning. Mobil petitioned for a rehearing, which was granted by the court. The
court reaffirmed the previous decision in the second case, McDonald II, but again, with no
majority opinion.
2. McDonald 1, 789 P.2d at 867-68. The application stated in part:
READ CAREFULLY BEFORE
SIGNING
I agree that any offer of employment, and acceptance thereof, does not constitute
a binding contract of any length, and that such employment is terminable at the will
of either party, subject to appropriate state and/or federal laws.
McDonald 1H, 820 P.2d at 988.
3. The general welcoming section in Mobil's handbook read:
WELCOME
Mobil Coal Producing, Inc., Caballo Rojo Mine, is proud to welcome you as an
employee. We believe you will find safety, opportunity and satisfaction while making
your contribution to Mobil's growth as a major supplier of coal. This handbook is
intended to be used as a guide for our nonexempt mine technicians and salaried
support personnel, to help you understand and explain to you Mobil's policies and
procedures. It is not a comprehensive policies and procedures manual, nor an employment contract. More detailed policies and procedures are maintained by the Employee Relations supervisor and your supervisor. While we intend to continue policies,
benefits and rules contained in this handbook, changes or improvements may be
made from time to time by the company. If you have any questions, please feel free
to discuss them with your supervisor, a member of our Employee Relations staff,
and/or any member of Caballo Rojo's Management. We urge you to read your
handbook carefully and keep it in a safe and readily available place for future refbe revised as conditions affecting your employment or benefits
erence. Sections will
change.
Sincerely,
/s/

R.J. Kovacich
Mine Manager
Caballo Rojo Mine
McDonald 11, 820 P.2d at 989.
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• . . Mobil's policies and procedures." ' 4 To further that intention, the
handbook contained a "Fair Treatment Procedure," 5 a progressive

discipline schedule, 6 and a listing of "fundamental obligations" that
Mobil was to fulfil.

7

The handbook stated in its welcoming section

that Mobil intended to continue the policies, benefits, and rules in
the handbook. However, it stated in the same section that it was not

a "comprehensive policies and procedures manual, nor an employment contract,"

8

and stated that changes could be made by the com-

pany "from time to time." 9

McDonald worked in the Caballo Rojo mine in Campbell County,
Wyoming for 10 months. In the first week of June, 1988, McDonald
heard rumors that a co-employee was asserting that McDonald sexually harassed her.' 0 Concerned about possible problems, McDonald
reported these rumors to his supervisor," and the supervisor told him
not to worry about it.12 On June 9th, 1988, McDonald was ordered
to meet with his supervisor, the mine superintendent and the supervisor of employee relations, who told him that he had the choice of

resigning or being fired.' 3
After resigning, McDonald filed suit in the Campbell County
District Court against Mobil and others, 4 claiming breach of contract,
breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, negligence and

4. Id.
5. The Fair Treatment Procedure was a procedure consisting of an employee's opportunity to talk with a supervisor about a problem. If the problem was not resolved to the liking
of the employee, the employee could take the matter up with other supervisors. McDonald I,
789 P.2d at 868. The employee had "an opportunity to be heard, without fear of reprisal."
McDonald I1, 820 P.2d at 990.
6. The handbook detailed a progressive discipline schedule, along with a list of behaviors
Mobil would not tolerate. McDonald 1, 789 P.2d at 868. The list was noninclusive, however.
Id. The steps in the progressive discipline schedule Mobil was to follow began with counselling
on the first offense. After the second offense came a written reprimand. The third offense
resulted in suspension and on the fourth offense, the employee would be discharged. Id.
7. McDonald 1, 789 P.2d at 868. Seven fundamental obligations were detailed in the
handbook. Id. The court in McDonald I cited three of them:
(2) To train and guide employees, allow them to develop their job abilities and
regularly keep them informed of their progress.
(3) To invite constructive suggestions and criticism and guarantee the right to
be heard without fear of reprisal.
(4) To give helpful consideration when an employee makes a mistake or has a
personal problem with which we asked to help.
Id.
8. McDonald II, 820 P.2d at 989.
9. Id.
10. McDonald 1, 789 P.2d at 867.
11. Brief of Appellant at 3, McDonald 1, 789 P.2d 866 (Wyo. 1990) (No. 89-146) [hereinafter Brief of Appellant].
12. McDonald II, 820 P.2d at 991.
13. Brief of Appellant, supra note 11, at 3-4.
14. McDonald , P.2d at 868. The parties in the action are listed as follows: Craig McDonald
v. Mobil Coal Producing, Inc.; Brad Hanson, the mine superintendent; Peter Totin, the mine
supervisor of employee relations; and Bert Gustafson, the preparation plant supervisor.
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defamation.' 5 The district court granted summary judgment in favor
of Mobil, stating that the disclaimers in the handbook preserved the
at-will employment relationship.', The lower court noted that despite
the "tenor" of the handbook which could cause it to be 7construed
as a contract, McDonald's employment remained at-will.'
On appeal, the Supreme Court of Wyoming reversed summary
judgment and remanded the case to the trial court.' 8 Relying on the
theory of promissory estoppel, a plurality held that an employee may
be able to enforce representations made by an employer in an employee handbook.' 9 Mobil subsequently filed a Petition for Rehearing
and Clarification, due to the conflicting nature of the McDonald I
opinions .20
The Wyoming Supreme Court granted Mobil's petition for re2
hearing "to review and clarify" its prior decision. ' On rehearing,
judgment.
summary
reverse
to
decision
the court reaffirmed its earlier
whether
as
to
ambiguity
found
plurality
a
different
however,
This time,
Mobil intended to modify McDonald's employment status from atwill to an employment that could only be terminated for cause. 22 The
plurality further held that Mobil's disclaimer which indicated the
handbook was not a contract was insufficiently conspicuous to bind
McDonald.23 Finally, the court remanded to the trial court for a determination of whether the employee handbook and Mobil's course

15. Id. Mobil and the other named defendants moved to dismiss the suit. The district
court treated the motions to dismiss as motions for summary judgment, due to extraneous
materials filed along with the defendant's motion. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 867. The negligence and defamation claims were not the subject of McDonald's
appeal. Id. at 868. The good faith and fair dealing claim was discussed briefly, the court
holding that either party may terminate at-will employment without breaching the duty of good
faith and fair dealing. Id. This casenote does not consider the defamation, negligence or good
faith and fair dealing claims. For an excellent discussion of the concept of good faith and fair
dealing as applied to employment contracts in Wyoming, see Kelley H. Anderson, Casenote,
The Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing-Doesit Apply to Employment Contracts? Hatfield v. Rochelle Coal Co., 813 P.2d 1308 (Wyo. 1991), 26 LAND & WATER L. Rv. 173 (1992).
19. McDonald 1, 789 P.2d at 870. If the employer should reasonably have expected the
employee to consider the representations as a commitment from the employer, the employee
reasonably relied upon the representations to his detriment, and injustice can be avoided only
by enforcement of representation, then the employee may enforce the representations. Id. Justice
Golden's concurrence, however, explicitly rejected the application of promissory estoppel, and
stated that the provisions in the handbook "juxtaposed against the disclaimer," created ambiguity as to the intent of the parties concerning the employment terms. Id. at 870-71.
20. Appellee's Brief on Rehearing at 6, McDonald I1, 820 P.2d 986 (Wyo. 1991) (No.
89-146).
21. McDonald II, 820 P.2d 986, 987 (Wyo. 1991).
22. Id. at 991.
23. Id.at 989. The court followed Jimenez v. Colorado Interstate Gas Co., 690 F. Supp.
977 (D. Wyo. 1988) in finding that if a disclaimer is not set off from the other provisions,
is not capitalized or in larger print, or contained only under a general welcoming section, then
the disclaimer is not conspicuous. McDonald I, P.2d at 989.
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of dealing with McDonald modified the terms of the at-will employment relationship. 24
This casenote examines the law surrounding at-will employment
in Wyoming and the effect employee handbooks have on this arrangement. It analyzes the Wyoming Supreme Court's opinions in
both McDonald I and McDonald II in order to clarify the present
state of the law. It argues that the law set forth by the plurality in
McDonald II correctly follows Wyoming precedent, and is therefore
controlling law. Finally, this casenote presents several guidelines employers may follow in order to preserve the at-will employment status
of its employees.
BACKGROUND

At-will employment in America began its climb to prominence
with an 1877 treatise written by American legal theorist H.G. Wood.Y
Wood proposed that, absent an understanding between employer and
employee, a presumption existed that employment has no duration,
and either party could terminate the employment at any time.2 Atwill employment was first acknowledged by the United States Supreme Court in Adair v. United States.27 The Court found that it
was "not within the functions of government," absent a contract,
to compel a person to retain services of another, or compel a person
to perform services for another against their will.n
In 1937, the Wyoming Supreme Court acknowledged at-will employment in Casper National Bank v. Curry.29 The court stated that
unless a definite period of time was specified in the contract regarding
the employment term, the employment was at-will and the employee
or employer could terminate the employment at any time.30 Many
later Wyoming cases also support the at-will employment rule" and

24. Id. at 991.
25. PAUL 1. WEINER ET AL., WRoNGFuL DiscHARGo CIs
As: A PREVENTATIvE APPROACH
6-7 (1986).
26. H.G. WOOD, A TREATISE ON THE LAw OF MASTER AND SEnvA
272-73 (1877).
Prior to this treatise, American courts followed the English rule, where a presumption existed
that employment consisted of one year blocks. WEINER, supra note 25, at 5.
27. 208 U.S. 161 (1908). The United States Supreme Court stated that in the absence of
a contract, the employer and employee have the right to terminate employment at any time.
Id. at 175-76.
28. Id. at 174.
29. 65 P.2d 1116 (Wyo. 1937). In that case, no definite period of time was set for the
duration of an employment contract. The employer claimed that since there was no contract
of any specified length, then he was not obligated to pay the employee for his services. Id.
at 1120. The court found that even though no contract existed, the employment was deemed
at-will, and the employee was entitled to wages for the time he had worked. Id. at 1121.
30. Id. at 1120, 1121 (citing Watson v. Gugino, 98 N.E. 18, 20 (N.Y. 1912)).
31. See, e.g., Long v. Forbes, 136 P.2d 242 (Wyo. 1943); Lukens v. Goit, 430 P.2d 607
(Wyo. 1967); Carlson v. Bratton, 681 P.2d 1333 (Wyo. 1984); Siebken v. Town of Wheatland,
700 P.2d 1236 (Wyo.1985).
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the rule has recently been reaffirmed by the Wyoming Supreme Court.3 2
Modification of At- Will Employment
Early efforts to modify at-will employment relationships were
met with disapproval.S3 In time, however, courts began to acknowledge that exceptions to the at-will rule exist. Federal and state statutes
have found exceptions
to
have limited the at-will rule, 34 and courts 36
37
35
the rule based on public policy, contract and tort claims.
In 1984, the Wyoming Supreme Court considered contract based
exceptions to at-will employment in Carlson v. Bratton18 In Carlson,
the court stated the general rule that "[a]bsent a discrimination
amounting to a violation of civil rights, a person does not have tenure
in employment unless such tenure is established by statute or by con-

32. Lankford v. True Ranches, Inc., 822 P.2d 868 (Wyo. 1991).
33. Michael A. Chagares, Utilization Of The DisclaimerAs An Effective Means To Define
The Employment Relationship, 17 HoVssRA L. REV. 365, 367, (1989). Courts have held that
modifications to the at-will employment contract were unenforceable because of indefiniteness,
lack of mutuality of obligation, and lack of independent consideration. Id. at 368-69.
34. See, e.g., The Civil Service Reform Act, 5 U.S.C. § 7513(a) (1978), (allowing discharge
only for "such case as will promote the efficiency of the service"); Title VII of The 1964 Civil
Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 200e-2(a)(2) (prohibiting discharge due to "race, color, religion, sex,
or national origin").
35. See Griess v. Consolidated Freightways Corp. of Delaware, 776 P2d. 752 (Wyo. 1989)
(holding that an employer cannot discharge employee for filing workers compensation claim).
Similar to the public policy exception is the covenant of good faith and fair dealing claim
exception. See Monge v. Beebe Rubber Co., 316 A.2d 549 (N.H. 1974) (holding that discharge
made in "bad faith or malice or based on retaliation" is against public policy). In Wyoming,
the Wyoming Supreme Court has not recognized a good faith and fair dealing exception to
the at-will doctrine. See Hatfield v. Rochelle Coal Co., 813 P.2d 1308, 1309 (Wyo. 1991). But
see Anderson, supra note 18 (arguing that there should be a good faith and fair dealing exception).
36. Two theories have been advanced: implied unilateral contract and promissory estoppel. See Mobil Coal Producing, Inc., v. Parks 704 P.2d 702 (Wyo. 1985) for an example of
how the unilateral contact theory has been applied. See McDonald 1, 789 P.2d 866 (Wyo. 1990)
for the application of promissory estoppel as an exception to the at-will doctrine. See also
Continental Air Lines, Inc. v. Keenan, 731 P.2d 708 (Colo. 1987) (recognizing both theories).
37.

See IRA MICHAEL SHEPARD, ET AL., WITHouT JUST CAusE: AN EMPLoYERS PRACTICAL

AND LEOAL GUIDE ON WRONoFuL DISCHARGE 127 (1989) (discussing the tort claims of intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress, tortious interference with an existing business relationship, fraud and negligent misrepresentation, defamation, and invasion of privacy).
This casenote considers only the contract based exceptions to employment at-will.
38. 681 P.2d 1333 (Wyo. 1984). In Carlson, the Mayor of Newcastle, Wyoming, discharged Snider, the Newcastle chief of police, from his position. The City Council ordered the
Mayor to specify the reasons for the discharge, and directed him to reinstate Snyder. The
Council also ordered a hearing to ascertain whether there was cause for discharge. Id. at 1335.
The court found that there was no right to continue the position as chief of police. Id. at
1338. The court also decided whether the Administrative Procedure Act limited the Mayor's
ability to discharge the chief of police by requiring a hearing. The court found that the Act
only required a hearing when a person was "removed from office for incompetency, neglect
of duty, or otherwise for cause." Id. The Wyoming Supreme Court found that this did not
occur, and held that the Mayor had authority to discharge the chief of police without a hearing.
Id.
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tract or by rules and regulations pursuant to statute or by rules and
regulations having the force of a contract."'3
Modification of At- Will Employment Through Employee
Handbooks
The theory that an employer's rules and regulations included in
employee handbooks may modify at-will employment was set firmly
in Wyoming law with the Wyoming Supreme Court decision in Mobil
40 The court addressed the question of
Coal Producing, Inc. v. Parks.
whether Mobil's handbook, which set forth policies, procedures, rules
and regulations, created legally binding terms of employment.", The
court found the handbook "[clhanged [Mobil's] unfettered right to
discharge [Parks] at any time and without cause." 42 The court stated,
however, that a handbook would not alter at-will employment in all
cases: "Each case must be considered on its own merits. Some handbooks or manuals may not contain provisions which negate the employment at-will. Some handbooks or manuals may be ambiguous or
may not have apparent meaning, making the determination of their
effect on at-will employment a question of fact." ' 43 The court went
on to state that if a contract is ambiguous, evidence outside the contract is needed in order to determine the intention of the parties."
The Wyoming Supreme Court followed Parks in Alexander v.
Phillips Oil Co.,4- and Leithead v. American Colloid Co.;6 the Fed39. Id. at 1339 (emphasis added). Since the Administrative Procedures Act did not require
a hearing, it did not set out rules and regulations amounting to a contract. Id. at 1338-39.
40. 704 P.2d 702 (Wyo. 1985). Parks was the first ease where Mobil's handbook was
found to modify the at-will employment status of one of its employees. Parks' employment
was terminated, and he claimed that Mobil did not follow its handbook procedures in the
termination process. The court found that the evidence supported the finding that Mobil did
not comply with the procedures outlined in the manual, and therefore, Parks was wrongfully
terminated. Id. at 708.
41. id. at 704. The court found Mobil's employee handbook modified Parks' at-will
status. The court stated that an employee handbook may become part of the employment
contract by listing more than just the hours of work, pay scale, pension rights, promotion
policy, etc., and that such a handbook addressed the right of an employer to discharge its
employees at any time. Id. at 706. After the case had been decided, Mobil revised its handbook,
the revision being the handbook at issue in McDonald I and McDonald 11. McDonald 1. 789
P.2d 866, 869 (Wyo. 1990).
42. Parks, 704 P.2d at 707. The provisions the court found which changed Ihe at-wil
employment were the progressive discipline procedures, which were preceded by the statement
that "Idlisciplinary suspension subject to termination will be imposed when the seriousness of
an individual offense or the employee's record of prior rule infractions warrants [sic] such
action." Id. at 706. The court stated that "[n]ot only does the tenor of the foregoing reflect
the necessity ... of cause for discharge, but specifically requires such. Id.
43. Id. at 706.
44. Id.
45. 707 P.2d 1385 (Wyo. 1985). An employee brought a wrongful termination suit against
his employer claiming the handbook and manual he received created enforceable contract terms
which were not complied with by the employer. Id.
46. 721 P.2d 1059 (Wyo. 1986). An employee brought a wrongful termination suit against
his employer claiming the two handbooks he received created enforceable contract terms which
were not complied with by the employer. Id.
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eral District Court of Wyoming also followed Parks in Jimenez v.
Colorado Interstate Gas Co. 47 In each of these cases, the courts found
that the employer's procedures outlined in a handbook or other employee materials became part of the employment contract. In Alexander, the Wyoming Supreme Court found that by considering the
handbook as a whole and looking at the surrounding facts of that
case, 49 the handbook modified the at-will relationship by creating enforceable contract terms. 0 In Leithead, the court stated that benefits
extended to the employee in the employee handbook constituted enforceable contract terms, thus requiring cause for discharge. 5 The
Federal District Court of Wyoming followed these Wyoming Supreme
Court cases in Jimenez, finding that Colorado Interstate Gas' standard operating procedures created implied contract rights, which led
the court to hold that the procedures required cause for discharge.12
The Wyoming Supreme Court disregarded the Parks line of cases
in McDonald I, and took a new approach in analyzing an employee
handbook's effect on at-will employment." A plurality, consisting of
Justices Macy and Urbigkit, found that Mobil's handbook did not
become part of the employment contract since the express disclaimer

47. 690 F. Supp. 977 (D. Wyo. 1988). An employee brought a wrongful termination suit
against his employer claiming the standard operating procedures that were posted in the employee's coffee room created enforceable contract terms which were not complied with by the
employer. Id.
48. The court found inconsistency in the handbook as to whether cause was needed for
discharge. The court stated that although the handbook provided that "any employee service
can be terminated, with or without cause," it implied that cause was necessary by listing conduct
that would result in discharge. Alexander, 707 P.2d at 1388.
49. Id. The court gave weight to the fact that the employer "used extreme methods to
establish the existence of a cause for discharge," by placing the employee under surveillance
in order to determine if the employee was in fact violating the rules of the company. Id. at
1389. The court stated that these circumstances can be used to interpret the ambiguous handbook. Id. at 1388-89.
50. Id. at 1389.
51. Leithead v. American Colloid, 721 P.2d 1059, 1063 (Wyo. 1986). The employee handbook contrasted probationary and permanent employees, stating that probationary employees
could be discharged at-will. Thus, the handbook "strongly impl[ied]" that permanent employees
can only be discharged for cause. Id. The court continued, stating that the listing of misconduct
that could lead to discharge implies that cause is required for discharge. Id.
52. Jimenez v. Colorado Interstate Gas Co, 690 F. Supp. 977, 980 (D. Wyo. 1988). The
court found that Colorado Interstate Gas' language in its standard operating procedures (SOP's),
regarding the causes of termination was similar to the employee handbook language in Parks,
Leithead and Alexander. The court stated that the same conclusion as in those cases should
be reached - that the tenor of the SOP's requires cause for discharge. Id.
53. McDonald 1, 789 P.2d 866 (Wyo. 1990). The handbook in McDonaldIwas a modified
version of the handbook in Parks, with the most significant revision being the addition of the
express disclaimer that stated the handbook was not a contract. Id. at 869. See also Brief of
Appellee at 18, McDonald 1, 789 P.2d (Wyo. 1990) (No. 89-146). Attachment "A" of the
brief shows the provisions of the Parks decision where Mobil's handbook was cited, indicating
the changes that were made by Mobil after Parks was decided. Id.
The same day that McDonald I was decided, the court decided Ware v. Converse County
School District No. 2, 789 P.2d 872 (Wyo. 1990), in which it relied on the McDonald I opinion
to decide whether Ware was wrongfully discharged. Id. at 875, 876.
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demonstrated Mobil's intent not to create a contract . 4 The plurality
then held that an employee may enforce terms in an employee handbook by using a promissory estoppel theory when no contract can
be found."5 The promissory estoppel theory, however, was rejected
by the other members of the court, including Justice Golden in his
concurring opinion.16 Justice Golden's opinion followed the law set
out in the Parks line of cases, finding that the handbook was ambiguous and this ambiguity created issues of material fact as to the
intent of the parties' terms of employment. 7 The two dissenters,
Justices Thomas and Cardine, argued that the disclaimers included
in Mobil's handbook and in McDonald's employment application were
completely effective in preserving the at-will relationship."8
Because the Wyoming Supreme Court rendered four conflicting
opinions, the law regarding the effect of handbooks on at-will employment after McDonald I was unclear. Upon Mobil's petition for
rehearing asserting confusion, the Wyoming Supreme Court granted
a rehearing to "review and clarify [its] earlier decision."' 9
PRINCIPAL CASE

In McDonald II, a different plurality, consisting of Justices
Golden and Urbigkit, held that issues of material fact existed as to
whether Mobil's handbook modified the at-will employment relationship. 60 This plurality relied primarily on Parks6' in discussing
whether Mobil manifested an intent to modify the at-will employment
of McDonald; to bolster its reasoning, the plurality relied on sections
19 and 21 of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts which addresses
the conduct and intention of parties to a contract. 62

54. McDonald I, 789 P.2d at 869.
55. Id. at 870. The theory, set out in the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 90
(1981), led the court to hold that an employee is entitled to enforce a representation in an
employee handbook by demonstrating that "[t]he employer should have reasonably expected
the employee to consider the representation as a commitment from the employer; the employee
reasonably relied upon the representation to his detriment; and injustice can be avoided only
by enforcement of the representation." McDonald 1, 789 P.2d at 870.
56. McDonald 1, 789 P.2d at 870. The concurring opinion by Justice Golden expressly
rejected the application of promissory estoppel to this case. Id.
57. Id. at 870-71.
58. Id. at 871-72 (Thomas, J., dissenting; Cardine, J., dissenting).
59. McDonald 11, 820 P.2d 986, 987 (Wyo. 1991).

60. Id. at 988.
61. See supra notes 40-44 and accompanying text.
62. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 19, 21 (1981). Section 19 reads in part:
(1)The manifestation of assent may be made wholly or partly by written or
spoken words or by other acts or by failure to act.
(2) The conduct of a party is not effective as a manifestation of his assent unless
he intends to engage in the conduct and knows or has reason to know that the other

https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/land_water/vol28/iss1/7

8

Greenlee: Contract Law - Employee Handbooks: At-Will or Not At-Will - A Que

1993

CASENOTES

The plurality found that Mobil's "numerous statements" in the
handbook could be "construed as promises", and Mobil's "course
of conduct" could lead McDonald to believe that Mobil would follow
the procedures in the handbook. 63 "[These manifestations," the plurality reasoned, "could suggest to a reasonable person that Mobil

intended to make legally binding promises.''

64

After finding that the procedures in Mobil's handbook and Mobil's course of conduct created ambiguity, 65 the plurality quoted Parks
stating that "[i]f the meaning of a contract is ambiguous, or not
apparent, it may be necessary to determine the intention of the parties
from evidence other than the contract itself, and interpretation becomes a mixed question of law and fact." 66
The plurality followed Jimenez v. Colorado Interstate Gas Co. ,67
requiring that disclaimers must be conspicuous in order to be effective, and concluded that the trial court erred when it stated that conspicuous disclaimers are not required." The plurality found that the
disclaimer Mobil used in its handbook, which attempted to eliminate
Mobil's contractual liability, was not conspicuous and therefore not
binding on McDonald. 69 The plurality continued, stating that the disclaimer's effect on the employment relationship was unclear to the
employee. 70

party may infer from his conduct that he assents.
Id.
Section 21 reads: "Neither real nor apparent intention that a promise be legally binding
is essential to the formation of a contract, but a manifestation of intention that a promise
shall not affect legal relations may prevent the formation of a contract." Id.
These sections enabled the court to conclude that Mobil's subjective intent to contract,
(shown by its express disclaimer which stated that the handbook did not create a contract),
was "irrelevant, provided that Mobil made . . . intentional, objective manifestations of contractual assent." McDonald II, 820 P.2d at 990. The court relied on the "objective theory"
of contract embodied in these sections, to conclude that "contractual obligation is imposed
. .. upon the outward manifestations of a party's assent sufficient to create reasonable reliance
by the other party." Id.
63. McDonald II, 820 P.2d at 991. The court gave weight to the general welcoming
section, which stated that Mobil intended to continue its policies, benefits and rules. See supra
note 3. The court also gave weight to Mobil's provisions that discouraged unionization and
promised job security, as well as the provisions that stated Mobil recognized fundamental
obligations to its employees. McDonald I1, 820 P.2d at 990. The court gave further weight to
Mobil's progressive disciplinary schedule outlined in the handbook. Id.
64. McDonald II, 820 P.2d at 991.
65. Id.
66. Id. (quoting Mobil Coal Producing, Inc. v. Parks, 704 P.2d 702, 706 (Wyo. 1985)).
67. 690 F. Supp. 977 (D. Wyo. 1988). See supra text accompanying note 52.
68. McDonald 1I, 820 P.2d at 988.
69. Id. at 989. The plurality stated that "the circumstances surrounding [Mobil's] disclaimer are nearly identical to those of the Jimenez case," stating that Mobil's disclaimer was
"contained in a general welcoming section," was "not set of by a border or larger print,"
and was not capitalized. Id.
70. Id.
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Relying on Woolley v. Hoffman-La Roche, Inc.,"' the plurality
held that because employees are untutored in contract law, a clear
explanation of the effect handbook language has on the employment
relationship is essential. 72 The plurality reasoned that McDonald was
led to infer from the handbook language that Mobil was bound by
its terms since the disclaimer was not clear and because the handbook
language stated that Mobil intended to continue policies set out in
its handbook." Oddly, the plurality made no mention of the promissory estoppel theory set forth in the McDonald I plurality opinion.
Justice Macy's specially concurring opinion in McDonald I1, however,
relied upon the McDonald I plurality opinion 4 (which he authored)
and urged that the only question to be resolved on remand was whether
Mobil's termination
procedures should have been enforced to avoid
7
an injustice. "
Justices Thomas and Cardine dissented. 76 In his dissent, Justice
Thomas stated that he did not know what more Mobil could have
77
done to make it clear to McDonald that his employment was at-will.
Thomas gave weight to the employment application McDonald
signed,7 1 and stated that the plurality did not take into account that
McDonald and Mobil entered into a specific at-will relationship as
evidenced by McDonald's employment application. 79 Thomas stated

71. 491 A.2d 1257 (N.J. 1985), modified, 499 A.2d 515 (N.J. 1985). In that case, the
court found that an unfair situation arises when an employer distributes a manual that creates
a belief in the employees that the policies and procedures contained in that manual will be
followed, and the employer is then allowed to "renege on those promises" and disregard the
policies and procedures. Id. at 1271.
72. McDonald 1I, 820 P.2d at 989 (citing Woolley, 491 A.2d 1257 (N.J. 1985) modified,
499 A.2d 515 (N.J. 1985)). The Woolley court stated that "[wihat is sought here is basic
honesty: if the employer, for whatever reason, does not want the manual to be ... construed
by the court as a binding contract, there are simple ways to attain that goal." Woolley, A.2d
491 at 1271. The Woolley court then stated that what was needed was a "very prominent"
provision, stating that no promises are made by the employer in the manual, and that the
employer may fire anyone with or without good cause. Id.
73. McDonald I, 820 P.2d at 989.
74. Id. at 991.
75. M. at 991-92. Justice Macy found that Mobil's course of conduct clearly demonstrated
Mobil intended to be legally bound by its handbook procedures, and that Mobil led McDonald
to rely on those procedures. Id. at 991.
76. Continuing his dissent in McDonald I, Justice Cardine argued that all the plurality
opinion in this case does is set out additional requirements for effective disclaimers. Id. at
992-93 (Cardine, J., dissenting). Justice Cardine criticized the plurality opinion in this case for
using language that implied that "the making of a promise alone reasonably relied upon by
another creates an enforceable contract." Id. at 993. To the contrary, he argued that there
must be a meeting of the minds, and that because of Mobil's disclaimer, there was neither
intent, nor any such meeting of the minds, nor was there consideration to support a contract.
Id. He stated therefore that "[tihere was no contract," and "[tlhat is why this court in McDonald
I [used] promissory estoppel" in its decision to reverse summary judgment. Id.
77. Id. at 992 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
78. Id.See supra note 2.
79. Id.Justice Thomas attempted to distinguish Jimenez and Alexander on this fact as
well as the fact that Mobil's handbook was adopted and issued before McDonald was employed.
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that this case "strikes the death knell for employment at-will in
Wyoming." 80 He argued that there can no longer be communication
between employer and employee about the conditions and circumstances of employment, and "if any such dialogue occurs, it will be
considered to have amended the arrangement.''81 He then concluded
hereafter impossible to have an employment atby saying that "it is
' 82
will in Wyoming."
ANALYSIS

By rendering four conflicting opinions in McDonald 1,81and four
conflicting opinions in McDonald IIS the Wyoming Supreme Court
has thoroughly confused the law surrounding the effect employee
handbooks have on at-will employment. The court declared in
McDonald II that it granted Mobil's petition for rehearing in order
to clarify its McDonald I decision.8 5 Yet, the court's attempt at clarity
resulted only in continued confusion.
The Wyoming Supreme Court's confusion was clearly unnecessary; the effect of employee handbooks on employment at-will has
been well established in Wyoming law. Had the court in McDonald
I followed Parks, Alexander, Leithead and Jimenez, it would have
concluded that Mobil's handbook created contract terms which necessitated the existence of cause for the termination of McDonald's
employment, making the McDonald II rehearing superfluous.
Erroneous Application of Promissory Estoppel
Promissory estoppel is used only when consideration cannot be
found. 6 In examining the handbook in McDonald I, the plurality's
finding that the employee handbook was not part of McDonald's
employment contract because of Mobil's subjective intent was erroneous. Under the objective theory of assent, Mobil's subjective intent was irrelevant because of Mobil's sufficient, intentional objective
manifestations of contractual assent." McDonald's reasonable belief
that Mobil had the intention of creating an agreement was enough

Thomas could not understand how this could amend or change the employment at-will relationship, especially after McDonald had signed a statement that provided his employment was
terminable at-will. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. See supra notes 53-59 and accompanying text.
84. See supra notes 60-82 and accompanying text.
85. McDonald II,820 P.2d at 987.
86. E. AmAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS § 2.19, at 92 (2d ed. 1990). Promissory estoppel
is a substitute for consideration. Id.
87. McDonald 1I,820 P.2d at 990.
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to override Mobil's subjective intent.ss The plurality did not state that
consideration was lacking,"9 and even if it had, it would have been
incorrect; 90 therefore, the Wyoming Supreme Court's application of
promissory estoppel was erroneous. The Wyoming Supreme Court
was merely faced with a contract interpretation problem - whether
Mobil's handbook was in fact part of the employment contract, and
what effect it had on the employment relationship. 9'
The Parks Line of Cases: What the Court Should Have Done
Whether an employee handbook may become part of an employment contract, thereby limiting an employer's right to terminate
employees at-will, was resolved by the Wyoming Supreme Court in
Mobil Coal Producing, Inc. v. Parks.9 2 In Parks, the court found
that certain language included in an employee handbook can become
part of the employment contract, thereby changing an employer's
right to discharge its employees at-will.93 The Wyoming Supreme Court

88. FAMRswoRTu, supra note 86, § 3.7, at 122. "[A]s long as one intended to engage in
[certain) actions, there is no further requirement that the actions were done with the intention
of assenting to an agreement." Id. § 3.6, at 119-20. In finding there was no "meeting of the
minds", Justice Cardine advocated the outmoded subjective theory of assent. McDonald I1,
820 P.2d at 992-93 (Cardine, J.,dissenting). This theory has since yielded to the objective
theory of assent. FARNSWORTH, supra note 86, § 3.6, at 119. The plurality in McDonald I
recognized that its earlier decision in McDonald I was too subjective, and subsequently decided
that the objective theory of assent was the proper theory to apply in that case. McDonald I1,
820 P.2d at 990.
89. However, Justice Cardine in his McDonald IIdissent stated there was no consideration
to support the finding that there was a contract. McDonald I1,820 P.2d at 993 (Cardine, J.,
dissenting).
90. See Leithead v. American Colloid Co., 721 P.2d 1059, 1062 (Wyo. 1986). In Leithead,
the trial court found that the handbook was not supported by consideration so as to create
a contract. The Wyoming Supreme Court rejected this finding, stating that "[t]he rule of
additional consideration . . . is directly contrary to established Wyoming authority .... The

benefits extended to the employee in the handbook are enforceable contract terms, because
they are supported by consideration flowing to the employer. That consideration consists of
the benefit of an orderly, cooperative and loyal workforce." Id. at 1062-63 (emphasis added).
91. Even if the handbook was not part of the contract, promissory estoppel should not
be applied in wrongful termination cases. In Wyoming, promissory estoppel has been used
generally as a defense, and not as a substantive claim for relief. See Gay Johnson's Wyo.
Automotive Serv. Co. v. City of Cheyenne, 369 P.2d 863 (Wyo. 1962) ("Estoppel generally
may be asserted as a matter of defense or for the protection of a right but not for the 'creation
of a right."'). When the plurality in McDonald Idid not accept McDonald's breach of contract
claim, the court subsequently raised promissory estoppel as a substantive claim for McDonald.
Thus, the court erroneously departed from established Wyoming law. McDonald I, 789 P.2d
866 (Wyo. 1990).
This argument was advanced by Mobil in Appellee's Brief on Rehearing, supra note 20,
at 23-26.
92. 704 P.2d 702 (Wyo. 1985). The court cited Carlson v. Bratton, 681 P.2d 1333 (Wyo.
1984) for the principle that rules and regulations may have the force of a contract. See supra
text accompanying note 39. s
93. Parks, 704 P.2d at 706. The Parks court stated that the question to be resolved was
whether or not Mobil's handbook provisions created contractual terms. Id. at 704. The court
found that it did. Id. at 707. The court in Parks also cited many cases from other jurisdictions
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followed Parks in Alexander," and Leithead.91 In both of these cases,
the court found that the handbooks created contract terms that were
binding on the employer.
How an employee handbook may limit an employer's right to
terminate its employees at-will has been a settled question in Wyoming
law as well. The Wyoming Supreme Court has established several
factors9 which are relevant to this inquiry.
First, the specific language in the employment handbook should
be analyzed. In Parks, Mobil's handbook language changed the atwill status of the employee by setting out specific conduct that could
result in termination. 97 Likewise, in Leithead, the Wyoming Supreme
Court found that "[w]ithout the handbooks, the employment was at
will.... By listing misconduct that could result in discharge, the
handbooks imply that cause is required. " 98 The Federal District Court
of Wyoming applied the same principle in Jimenez v. Colorado Interstate Gas Co. 99 The District Court found that the employer's standard operating procedures, which contained language that was
substantially the same as in Leithead, implied that cause was required
for discharge.:0 Finally, in Alexander, the Wyoming Supreme Court
found that the handbook's listing of causes in which discharge would
occur, contrasted with the handbook's statements that discharge could
occur with or without cause, created an inconsistency with respect to
whether the employer "represented that discharge can only be for
cause." '' Consequently, by listing behaviors Mobil would not con-

which held an employee handbook may become part of the employment contract. Id. The court
declared, however, that the existence of a handbook would not alter the at-will status of a
company's employees in every case. Id. at 706. The court found that some handbooks may
not contain language that changes the employment at will, and others may contain provisions
that make the handbook and the employment contract ambiguous, and therefore require contract interpretation. Id. Justice Thomas' statement that at-will employment is impossible in
Wyoming is squarely in contradiction with the findings of the Parks majority. McDonald I1,
820 P.2d at 992 (Thomas, J., dissenting). Hence, Justice Thomas' statement is perplexing, since
he himself was a member of the Parks majority.
94. The court in Alexander cited Parks extensively, and concluded that by considering
the handbook as a whole, and examining the circumstances of the case, the at-will employment
was changed to an employment where cause was required, thus becoming a contract. Alexander
v. Phillips Oil Co., 707 P.2d 1385, 1386 (Wyo. 1985). The Alexander court acknowledged that
the Wyoming Supreme Court has allowed handbooks to become part of the employment contract. Id. at 1389 n.4 (referring to the Wyoming Supreme Court's holding in Parks).
95. In Leithead v. American Colloid Co., the court stated that "[the benefits extended
to the employee in the handbook are enforceable contract terms .... " 721 P.2d 1059, 1062
(Wyo. 1986). See supra note 90 for the court's explanation as to why the terms were enforceable.
96. The Federal District Court of Wyoming also contributed to these factors in Jimenez
v. Colorado Interstate Gas Co., 690 F. Supp. 977 (D. Wyo. 1988).
97. Parks, 704 P.2d at 705.
98. Leithead, 721 P.2d at 1062-63.
99. 690 F. Supp. 977 (D. Wyo. 1985).
100. Id. at 980.
101. Alexander v. Phillips Oil Co., 707 P.2d 1385, 1388 (Wyo. 1985). The ambiguity in
the handbook made it necessary for the court to look at circumstances outside the handbook.
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done, combined with a detailed discipline procedure, Mobil's handbook in McDonald II should have been found to imply that cause
was necessary for discharge.
Second, the general "tenor" of a handbook should be examined.
In Parks, Alexander, and Leithead, the "tenor" of the handbooks
reflected the necessity of cause for discharge. In finding such "tenor",
the Wyoming Supreme Court looked to the specific provisions in the
handbooks to conclude that the handbooks reflected necessity of cause
for discharge. 0 2 By containing language that is substantially similar
to the handbooks in Alexander, Leithead, and Parks, the "tenor"
of Mobil's handbook is thus substantially the same; Mobil's hand-

book reflects the necessity of cause for discharge. 03

Third, when a handbook contains language that creates ambiguity, the court may examine circumstances outside the handbook to
determine its effect on the employment relationship.0 The Wyoming
Supreme Court in Alexander found inconsistency in the language of
the handbooks, 0 5 and therefore it combined the handbook's language
with the circumstances surrounding the discharge, and concluded that
the employment was not at-will.' 6 Mobil's handbook in McDonald
II presented a similar inconsistency, wherein Mobil's handbook con-7
tained language that implied cause was necessary for discharge; 0
however, McDonald's employment application stated his employment
was terminable at-will.' 08 Accordingly, the plurality correctly examined the circumstances surrounding McDonald's discharge. 09
Finally, any disclaimers that are included in an employee handbook should be analyzed. The disclaimer in Jimenez stated that the

Id. at 1389. See infra notes 105-06 and accompanying text. The court found that the language
and circumstances surrounding the handbook were sufficient to find that the employment was
not at-will. Id.
102. See Alexander, 707 P.2d at 1388. The court found that "except for the recitation
..that termination can be with or without cause, the tenor of the [handbooks] reflect necessity
of cause for discharge." Id.; see also Mobil Coal Producing, Inc. v. Parks, 704 P.2d 702, 706
(Wyo. 1985); Leithead. 721 P.2d at 1063.
103. Mobil's assertions that union representation was not necessary for job security, the
existence of a fair treatment procedure, the list of seven fundamental obligations Mobil was
to fulfill, along with the progressive discipline policy and listing of misconduct Mobil would
not condone, establishes a "tenor" which strongly implies that cause is needed for discharge.
See supra notes 3-7 and accompanying text.
104. Parks, 704 P.2d at 706.
105. Alexander, 707 P.2d at 1388. On one hand, the handbook contained language which
implied that cause was necessary for discharge. On the other hand, the handbook stated that
employees could be terminated at any time, with or without cause. Id.
106. Id. at 1389.
107. See supra note 103 and accompanying text.
108. See supra note 2.
109. McDonald II, 820 P.2d 986, 991 (Wyo. 1991). The court, however, left to the trial
court the determination as to whether the handbook became a part of the employment contract.
Id.
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standard operating procedures did not constitute terms of an employment contract." 0 The Jimenez court held that this disclaimer was
not conspicuous."' Hence, the standard operating procedures became
part of the contract, and limited the employer's right to terminate
its employees at-will." 2 The plurality in McDonald II, in nearly the
same situation as Jimenez, correctly held that the disclaimer contained
in Mobil's handbook was not conspicuous, and therefore not binding
on McDonald.'
The application of these factors set out by established Wyoming
precedent confirms the plurality's finding in McDonald II that Mobil's handbook may well have become part of the employment contract, thereby restricting Mobil's right to terminate its employees atwill. In analyzing Mobil's handbook in McDonaldII, Justices Thomas,
Cardine and Macy should have also examined these factors closely.
Had they done so, they would have supported the plurality opinion,
and followed the precedent set by the Parks line of cases .
The outcome of McDonald II, however, does not have the catastrophic consequences that Justice Thomas claims it has. By applying
the foregoing factors, a court may still decide that a handbook does
not become part of the employment contract, or that the provisions
in the handbook do not have an effect on the at-will terminability

of its employees.'

At-will employment is vulnerable, however, when

an employer includes in its employee handbooks language of the sort
found in the Parks line of cases. Certain guidelines must therefore
be followed by employers so that employees cannot claim handbooks
create legally binding obligations which are unintended.

110. Jimenez, 690 F. Supp. at 980.
111. See supra text accompanying notes 67-70.
112. Jimenez, 690 F. Supp at 980.
113. McDonald 11, 820 P.2d at 989.
114. Justice Thomas' attempts to distinguish Alexander and Jimenez in McDonald 11 are
unpersuasive. Thomas argues that by "invoking these authorities, the majority . . . fails to
recognize the actual employment-at-will arrangement . .. entered into between McDonald and
Mobil ....
McDonald II, 820 P.2d at 992. What Thomas must mean, then, is that in
Alexander and Jimenez, there was no actual at-will employment arrangement. This conclusion
is erroneous. Since Alexander did not have an employment contract that stated a specified
duration of employment, his employment would therefore be deemed at-will. See Casper Nat'l
Bank v. Curry, 65 P.2d 1116 (Wyo. 1937). In addition, the handbook in Alexander expressed
the at-will arrangement: "[Any employee service can be terminated, with or without cause,
at any time, at the option of either the company or the employee." Alexander, 707 P.2d at
1387. There was an at-will arrangement in Alexander, though it was subsequently altered by
Alexander's receipt of his handbook. Likewise in Jimenez, since the employee did not have
an employment contract that stated a specified duration of employment, his employment would
therefore be deemed at-will. See Casper Nat'l Bank v. Curry, 65 P.2d 1116 (Wyo. 1937). Thus,
an at-will employment arrangement existed in Jimenez, which was subsequently altered by the
language in the employer's standard operating procedures. See supra text accompanying notes
67-70.
115. Mobil Coal Producing, Inc. v. Parks, 704 P.2d 702, 706 (Wyo. 1985).
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Guidelinesfor Employers
Justice Thomas' alarmist pronouncement of the impossibility of
at-will employment in Wyoming may send employers scurrying in an
effort to burn, shred or otherwise destroy employee handbooks in
order to preserve the at-will status of its employees. Employee handbooks however, are much too beneficial to discard. When a company
has a large workforce that is widely dispersed, the importance of
employee manuals becomes obvious."16 An employee manual would
facilitate the dissemination of important policies and rules that would
be too time consuming and costly to convey by any other means.
Even in smaller companies, the importance of handbooks becomes
great when the industry is highly regulated. 1 7 Handbooks are also
important to employers if they wish to prevent unionization,"' and
they also play an important role in ensuring consistent application
of policies." 9 Handbooks need not be discarded, but they need to be
drafted in such a way so as to avoid imposing liability on an employer
in a wrongful termination suit.
Provisions That Imply Cause is Required For Termination
All language in an employee manual indicating that cause is required for discharge must be removed. A listing of misconduct for
which discharge is possible has the effect of implying that an employee must engage in such misconduct in order to be terminated,
even if the list is noninclusive.2 t Progressive discipline policies have
this same effect. Not only do they imply that cause is needed for
discharge, but they suggest as well that the employer will follow the
procedure.'2 ' At the least, progressive discipline policies create ambiguity in the handbook as to whether cause is needed for termination. 22
116. WEINER, supra note 25, at 75.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 75-76.
120. See Mobil Coal Producing, Inc. v. Parks, 704 P.2d 702, 705 (Wyo. 1985). Mobil's
handbook stated "[a]ny employee who violates these rules subjects himself/ herself to degrees
of disciplinary action, up to and including termination.... The above general rules cannot
possibly cover all situations that arise."); In Alexander v. Phillips Oil Co., the handbook read:
"Employee's may be discharged for cause. This includes among other things. .. ." 707 P.2d
1385, 1387 (Wyo. 1985) (emphasis added).
121. See Parks, 704 P.2d at 706. The progressive discipline schedule was preceded by the
statement, "The nature of discipline will depend on the nature of the offense and/or the
employee's cumulative record." Id.; Pine River State Bank v. Mettille, 333 N.W.2d 622 (Minn.
1983). The disciplinary policy language in the employee handbook was an offer of unilateral
contract for procedures to be followed in job termination. The handbook language stated, "[i]f
an employee has violated a company policy, the following procedure will apply." Id. at 626
n.3.

122. See McDonald II, 820 P.2d 986 (Wyo. 1991). The court found that Mobil's statements
regarding communication and Mobil's discipline procedures, among other statements, created
ambiguity as to Mobil's intent to modify the at-will arrangement to an employment terminable
only for cause. Id.
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Employee handbooks should never be drafted to include any representations of employment security beyond what employment atwill provides.1 23 For example, language that states union representation is unnecessary for job security has the effect of implying that
cause is required for termination.' 4 However, other courts have found
that statements about job security are merely general statements of
policy. 25 Other language may also limit an employer's right to discharge its employees at-will as well. Stating that the company intends
to follow its policies creates an inference that the company will in

fact follow its policies. '26 The existence of grievance procedures may
also contribute to limiting an employer's right to terminate employees
at-will. 2 7 Thus, direct or indirect statements abqut job security should
always be avoided.12s
Disclaimers Preserving At-Will Employment
Employers have attempted to preserve the at-will status of its
employees through the use of adequate disclaimers with mixed resuits. 12 9 In Wyoming, the courts have been wary of such disclaimers,
and have looked beyond them in order to find binding terms in an
employee handbook. The Wyoming Supreme Court in McDonald II
has established that simply stating in an employment application that
the employment is at-will does not effectively preserve an employer's
right to terminate its employees at any time. 30 A statement in the
handbook itself declaring the employment is at-will has also been
found not to dissuade a finding that the employment was other than
123. JAsS R. REDEKER, EmptoYEE DiscWpwNE: POLICIES AND PRACTICES 99 (1989).
124. See McDonald II, 820 P.2d at 990. Mobil's handbook stated that giving individual
consideration was the best method of fulfilling employee and employer needs, and could not
-be improved by union representation. Id. The handbook also stated "union representation is
unnecessary for ... job security." Id.
125. See, e.g., Pine River State Bank v. Mettille, 333 N.W.2d 622, 630 (Minn. 1983).
126. See, e.g.. McDonald 11, 820 P.2d at 991. The court stated that "[the inference
favorable to McDonald is that Mobil would follow the rules unless changed, and that since
they had not been changed, Mobil was bound by them." Id.
127. Id. at 990. Mobil's fair treatment procedure "affords an employee the opportunity
to be heard, without fear of reprisal." Id.
128. See Alexander v. Phillips Oil Co., 707 P.2d 1385 (Wyo. 1985). The employee handbook stated, "[t]he company normally expects to furnish continuous employment to its employees." Id. at 1387; see also Leithead v. American Colloid Co., 721 P.2d 1059 (Wyo. 1986).
The handbook contrasted probationary and permanent employees and defined a probationary
employee to be one that could be discharged at-will. This strongly implied that a permanent
employee.could only be terminated for cause. Id. at 1061; Toussaint v. Blue Cross & Blue
Shield, 292 N.W.2d 880 (Mich. 1980). The handbook expressly stated that the company would
"release employees for just cause only." Id. at 893.
129. WEINER, supra note 25, at 87.
130. McDonald II, 820 P.2d 986 (Wyo. 1991). See supra note 2. But see, Reid v. Sears,
Roebuck & Co., 790 F.2d 453 (6th Cir. 1985) (holding that the employment application, which
specifically stated that the employment was at-will and the employee could be discharged at
any time, was effective in maintaining an at-will employment).
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at-will. 3' However, the Wyoming Supreme Court has accepted the
findings in Jimenez, holding that a disclaimer may be adequate if it
is both clear and conspicuous.' 3 2 To be clear, a handbook must state
who the disclaimer applies to, and should reserve the right of an
employer to change or modify the handbook at any time.'" The disclaimer should also "confirm the terminable at-will status of the employees.' 3 4 To be conspicuous in Wyoming, a disclaimer should
conform to the guidelines set forth in Jimenez: the disclaimer must
be set off in some way from the other provisions of the handbook,
either by a border, larger print, or capitalization, 3and the disclaimer
should not be included under a general heading.
Even though the Wyoming Supreme Court has found that disclaimers may adequately preserve at-will employment if they are conboth
spicuous, handbooks may become ambiguous when there are 136
If
promissory statements and disclaimers included in a handbook.
an employer is in doubt about whether a handbook which includes
a disclaimer may be deemed ambiguous, the employer should ask:
Why is this disclaimer in the handbook? If the answer is that the
disclaimer is intended to negate provisions in the handbook, such a
handbook is a candidate for ambiguity. Thus, the provisions that the
should be deleted, thereby avoiding
employer is attempting to negate
37
the possibility of ambiguity.'
The Wyoming Supreme Court has not been persuaded by Wyoming employers' "form over substance" arguments regarding employee
handbooks. Though McDonald II does not in any way make employment at-will impossible in Wyoming, the persistence of Wyoming
employers in including in their employee handbooks procedures that
imply anything but at-will employment will place at-will employment
in a perilous position. Consequently, employers who wish to preserve
at-will employment in Wyoming must avoid handbook language that
implies anything but an at-will relationship. Inserting into a handbook

131. See, e.g., Alexander, 707 P.2d at 1387. The handbook stated that "any employee
service can be terminated, with or without cause, at any time, at the option of either the
company or the employee." Id. The court found the handbook limited the employer's right
to discharge its employees at-will. Id. at 1389.
132. See McDonald I1,820 P.2d at 988-89 (adopting the rule set forth in Jimenez v.
Colorado Interstate Gas Co. 690 F. Supp. 977 (D. Wyo. 1988)). See supra text accompanying
notes 67-70. See also Woolley v. Hoffman La-Roche, Inc., 491 A.2d 1257, 1258 (N.J. 1985),
modified, 499 A.2d 515 (N.J. 1985); Thompson v. St. Regis Paper Co., 685 P.2d 1081, 1088
(Wash. 1984).
133. Chagares, supra note 33, at 381.
134. Id. at 382. In confirming the at-will status, the disclaimer should state that employment is terminable at the will of either party, that an employee may be terminated without
cause, and that termination can occur without prior notice. Id. at 384.
135. Jimenez v. Colorado Interstate Gas Co., 690 F. Supp. 977, 980 (D. Wyo. 1988).
136. See, e.g., McDonald I, 820 P.2d at 991; Alexander v. Phillips Oil Co., 707 P.2d
1385, 1388 (Wyo. 1985).
137. Chagares, supra note 33, at 393.
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a statement indicating the handbook does not create a contract is
merely an attempt by employers to disguise the true substance of the
employment handbook. The Wyoming Supreme Court has not been
fooled by this masquerade.
CONCLUSION

The Wyoming Supreme Court has not struck the death knell for
at-will employment in Wyoming. On the contrary, the court has
breathed life into contract rules which employers have failed to heed.
The plurality's McDonald II decision, following established Wyoming
law, requires employers to recognize that statements made in employee handbooks may bind an employer contractually, despite the
intention of the employer to the contrary. However, the other members of the court have failed to follow this established law, creating
pointless uncertainty for employers and employees alike, leaving them
to guess as to what the court will do next.
STEVEN
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